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 Irish Identities Before and After the Act
 of Union1
 Jacqueline Hill, N.U. I. Maynooth
 This paper considers how recent research is changing our perceptions of
 Irish identities in the eighteenth century. It assesses how those identities were
 affected by the upheavals of the 1790s and the Act of Union of 1800 and offers
 some reflections on how far those changes were the result of the Union or of
 broader factors at work.
 In the autumn of 1798, the British government brought forward a proposal
 for a legislative Union between Great Britain and Ireland. It was presented as
 the solution to a number of Ireland's ills, above all to the differences and
 divisions that had recently culminated in rebellion in 1798. A Union would,
 among other things, restore harmony and stability in Ireland by offering a new
 context for the solution of one of the most contentious political issues in the
 1790s: the Catholic question. In a United Kingdom, Irish Protestants would be
 reassured by being part of an overwhelmingly Protestant population, and
 would consequently be prepared to accept the extension of full political rights
 to Catholics in place of the partial enfranchisement that had existed since
 1793.2
 As we know, things did not work out like that. The Union of 1800 was
 intended to take religion out of Irish politics; in fact, post-Union Ireland was
 more, rather than less, divided on sectarian lines, and this certainly extended to
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 politics. And instead of being accepted as a new basis of political identity, the
 Union itself soon became a new cause of division. To nationalist historians of
 an earlier generation, the inadequacies of the Union scarcely required any
 explanation or analysis. It was enough for them that it was clearly incompatible
 with the enduring forces of Irish nationalism. Modern historians are less
 satisfied with this approach. They point out that the Scots and the Welsh did
 not lack national credentials, yet Union with England worked sufficiently well
 for them during the nineteenth century to forestall the emergence of strong
 nationalist or "home rule" movements.3
 But to judge the impact ofthe Union on Ireland and Irish identity, it is
 important first to consider the Ireland that came before 1800. What was that
 Ireland like? How has recent research extended or modified our view of it?
 Eighteenth-century Ireland is, of course, known as the age ofthe penal
 laws, and the image that springs to mind is that of a deeply divided society
 with religion providing the main line of division. As P. S. O'Hegarty put it in A
 History of Ireland Under the Union, there were two nations in eighteenth
 century Ireland: the Protestants, enjoying all the privileges and the
 "underground nation," the Catholics, lacking property, without freedom to
 practice their religion, excluded from parliament, the professions, and all
 political rights.4 While historians still debate the precise aim ofthe penal
 laws?to preserve political life as a Protestant monopoly or to bring about the
 extinction of Catholicism?the main thrust of research since O'Hegarty wrote
 has shifted away from the letter of the law towards an investigation of how the
 penal laws worked in practice; and the result has been to modify considerably
 the earlier picture.5 While on paper the laws were draconian, it has become
 apparent that many of them were not enforced evenly and, for much of the
 time, some weren't enforced at all. Patrick Fagan has highlighted the success of
 the Irish Catholic lobby in the early part of the century in enlisting the help of
 foreign powers, especially Austria, in mitigating the enforcement of the laws,
 and by mid-century Catholics in effect enjoyed freedom of worship (a right not
 made official until 1782).6 The late Maureen Wall drew attention to the
 importance of Catholics in trade, while Kevin Whelan has demonstrated the
 existence of a "strong farmer" element among Catholics, cultivating middle
 class virtues of thrift and hard work.7 Although they were excluded from the
 legal profession, Catholics did well in medicine.8 Where the penal laws were
 effective was in excluding Catholics from political life, or to be more precise,
 from formal political life, since studies are beginning to reveal informal
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 participation by Catholics, for instance at elections, despite being deprived of
 the vote.9 By conforming to the established Church of Ireland, Catholics could
 exercise the same rights as Protestants, and the existence of a convert element
 in Irish political life is a phenomenon that is also beginning to receive
 attention.10
 None of this meant that Ireland was not a deeply divided society, with great
 inequalities between the various religious denominations as well as between
 rich and poor. However, it is worth bearing in mind that all eighteenth-century
 European societies were highly unequal and tended to discriminate on
 confessional grounds. What made Ireland distinctive was that the Protestants?
 themselves divided into Anglicans and Dissenters?represented only a
 minority, not much more than one-quarter of the population. For most of the
 eighteenth century, however, the significance of this fact was muted, given that
 throughout Europe political rights tended to be concentrated in the hands of a
 land-owning elite. The issue of Catholic numbers only assumed major
 proportions when the question arose towards the end of the century of
 reforming the political system in a more democratic direction.11
 If the penal laws looked worse on paper than they were in practice, it has
 nevertheless been assumed that there was a deep gulf in terms of social values
 between Catholics, proud of their ancestry and culture, and parvenu
 Protestants who lacked pedigrees and aristocratic attributes. Again, recent
 research uncovers a more complex picture. Certainly it can be shown that
 Catholics continued to take pride in their pedigrees, and that some, despite
 losing their land, continued to patronise the Gaelic genealogists. Moreover, for
 Catholic emigres a noble pedigree was a requirement for holding office in
 certain continental countries.12 However, what has also been revealed is the
 extent to which Irish Protestants too were keen to establish their lineages, and
 to assert their status as "gentlemen."13 Some even patronised the same Gaelic
 genealogists as their Catholic counterparts. A case in point was that of Thomas
 Wilkinson, who became lord mayor of Dublin in 1720, and who was probably
 typical of many Protestants from mercantile backgrounds who came to Ireland
 in the wake of the Williamite reconquest. On the eve of making an
 advantageous match for his son, Wilkinson was anxious to have his own
 ancestry attested. What is surprising is that he bypassed the state official
 charged with such duties, the Ulster king at arms, and instead approached
 Charles Lynegar, who was eking out a precarious living teaching Irish in Trinity
 College, Dublin, and doing what his ancestors, the C> Luinin family of
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 hereditary genealogists, had always done: make out pedigrees.14 Perhaps
 Lynegar offered a cheaper service. At all events, he claimed to have access to
 noble genealogies of England as well as Ireland, and duly traced Wilkinson's
 pedigree back through various English gentry to one Robert, "Lord of
 Innspruck [sic] in Germany," and presumably had a satisfied client.15
 More generally, there continued to be a significant cultural division
 between English and Irish speakers. However, the Irish language was already
 under some pressure from the spread of books and newspapers, for the most
 part in English; and although a significant proportion of the books emanating
 from Catholic printers were Catholic devotional works, the fact that they too
 were mostly in English contributed to the anglicising effect.16
 Another aspect of elite status that cut across confessional divisions was the
 code of honour. The division that separated those who could pass themselves
 off as "gentlemen" from those who could not was arguably greater than that
 caused by religious difference. It has been pointed out that in early-modern
 Europe, honour and dishonour provided the currency in which men competed
 for reputation.17 The code of honour rested on the belief that the public
 reputation of a gentleman had to be free from stain or slight, otherwise he was
 not entitled to be regarded as part ofthe social and political elite. Hence the
 prevalence of duelling. Honour, and the right to take up arms to defend one's
 reputation against insult, were regarded as privileges exclusive to the upper
 classes, though in Ireland, where the Protestant landed elite was comparatively
 small, duelling was inclined to spread somewhat down the social scale, with
 some members of the mercantile and professional classes adopting the practice.
 Duelling is of interest because by engaging in it duellists were taking on two of
 the great institutions in eighteenth-century society: the churches (opposed to
 duelling on religious grounds) and the courts (whose methods of arbitration
 were at odds with those ofthe duellists). Thus the Irish elite reaffirmed its
 privileged status and its distinctiveness as a social group. Far from declining
 during the century, the historian of duelling finds that it reached a peak in the
 1770s and 1780s. It is remarkable that even certain United Irishmen, who
 (having read Tom Paine) had set themselves against aristocratic privilege, found
 themselves drawn into it. Leading United Irishmen who fought duels included
 Napper Tandy, Thomas Russell, Archibald Hamilton Rowan, Sir Simon Butler,
 and Henry Sheares.18
 As for Catholics, in principle they were excluded from the culture of
 duelling because from the 1690s to 1793 they were not permitted to bear arms.
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 However, certain Catholics had been officially exempted from the ban, and in
 any case there were parts of the country where the rule of law was not strictly
 observed. Thus even before the relaxation of the penal laws towards the end of
 the century there were Catholics who did fight duels, and it is noteworthy that
 as soon as the ban was relaxed, Catholics from the landed and professional
 classes adopted the practice as warmly as Protestants. The most notorious duel
 involving a Catholic was the one fought between Daniel O'Connell and a
 member of the Protestant corporation of Dublin in 1815, in which
 O'Connell s opponent was killed. O'Connell henceforth declined challenges to
 duel, but other Catholics continued to participate until the practice died out in
 Britain and Ireland from the 1830s.19 Thus the code of honour to some extent
 cut across religious divisions.
 What about political identities? One of the main developments in
 eighteenth-century historiography in recent years has been the moving of
 Jacobitism to centre stage. Literary historians have long debated the
 Importance of Jacobitism in Gaelic poetry, but the subject remained somewhat
 marginal for mainstream historians who (following Lecky) were inclined to
 doubt whether the phenomenon retained any more than a short-term hold
 over Catholics. Such a view is now difficult to sustain. New work by Patrick
 Fagan, Breandan (_) Buachalla, Vincent Morley, and Eamonn (_) Ciardha shows
 in considerable detail the extent to which Catholics continued to think in
 Jacobite terms.20 This only began to be challenged in the 1760s when Charles
 O'Conor of Belanagare and Dr John Curry adopted what has been called a
 "Hanoverian strategy" in their quest for a relaxation of the penal laws; and the
 point is made that for many years their writings were aimed at fellow Catholics
 as much as at Protestants.21 And if evidence from the book trade is anything to
 go by, in the course of the century Jacobitism and a sense of dispossession may
 have spread down the social scale, since there were several cheap editions of a
 key Jacobite work, Hugh Reily's Ireland's Case Briefly Stated.22 It has even been
 argued that for Catholics in the 1790s, Jacobitism was a more potent
 mobilising force than republicanism.23 Its importance in Ireland is
 complemented by the new attention historians now devote to English
 Jacobitism.24
 Irish Protestants, too, have come in for scrutiny, and particularly in respect
 to what historians have been accustomed to label their "nationalism."
 Difficulties arise with the label because however much Protestants may have
 defended Irish rights, they retained (at least in the early decades of the century)
 55
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 a strong Unionist outlook.25 There were also aristocratic and confessional
 overtones in Protestant definitions ofthe Irish nation," and an absence, at
 least until the end of the century, of the modern sense that the nation and the
 state should coincide. Consequently, the term "Patriotism"?a contemporary
 one?has become more widely used.26 But how did Protestants see their place
 in Ireland and their relations with the other inhabitants and with Britain?
 Several studies have taken up this theme, one of the most important being
 Colin Kidd's British Identities Before Nationalism.27 Kidd's starting point is that
 in the eighteenth century lineage or ancestry was the key to legitimisation, and
 that the history of race or ethnicity took second place to that of institutions
 and religion. In an age when biblical revelation was still the dominant force in
 intellectual life, there was general support for view set out in the Book of
 Genesis that all the world's peoples had a common origin. Racial differences
 were regarded less as innate (a view that became more common in the
 nineteenth and twentieth centuries) than as a matter of differentiation from a
 common stem. Racial or ethnic elitism was thus linked to assumptions about
 how different peoples had or had not cultivated the institutional values in
 church and state that were prized in the eighteenth century.28
 In England, it was widely assumed that the northern European ("Gothic,"
 or non-Roman) peoples had nurtured free institutions which had subsequently
 fallen victim to despotic kings or popes. Only in a few countries, notably
 England, had these institutions survived. Hence the boasted "liberties of
 Englishmen" represented an inheritance from the "Gothic" past, all the more
 to be prized because of their rarity. Irish Protestants, like those in North
 America and other parts ofthe Hanoverian dominions, were inclined to
 identify with this "imagined community," and this was one ofthe reasons for
 Unionist tendencies. However, Unionism was not the only possible response.
 Indeed, the government's resistance to a Union with Ireland in the early 1700s
 meant that Irish Protestants had little choice but to emphasise their links with
 the Old English in Ireland who had enjoyed their own ("Gothic") institutions
 of parliament and the common law.29 The ancient rights of such institutions
 could be invoked in any quarrels with the metropolitan power, as illustrated by
 William Molyneux in his protest against English attempts to curb the export
 potential of the Irish woollen industry. His influential The Case of Ireland,
 Stated represented a defence of the "ancient constitution" of the kingdom of
 Ireland, with an admixture of Lockeian natural law.30
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 The kingdom of Ireland was not a new idea in the eighteenth century, but
 for several reasons it received a considerable boost in the course of the century.
 For the first time, the Irish parliament (consisting of king, lords and commons)
 began meeting regularly: this was primarily a by-product of new ways of
 financing the Irish establishment, but it also facilitated a growing body of Irish
 legislation.31 In the seventeenth century, the rights of the parliament of the
 Irish kingdom had been advanced by Old English Catholic spokesmen,
 including Patrick Darcy, and given a historical dimension by one of the most
 influential writers of the century, Geoffrey Keating, in his Foras Feasa ar
 Eireann (History of Ireland) ,32 dating from the 1630s, and now the subject of an
 important new study.33 Protestant respect for Keating's work was facilitated by
 the fact that when it first appeared in print in 1723?after almost a century
 circulating in manuscript copies?it was in a version that conveyed a neutral
 Christian flavour to the Irish past instead of Keating's vigorous Catholicism.34
 After the Williamite settlement, the Irish parliament was barred to Catholics,
 but certain Protestants, including Molyneux, Jonathan Swift, Charles Lucas
 and Henry Grattan, took up the baton. They dropped what had been another
 key aspect of Keating's kingdom, the Irish language as a badge of identity, but
 in other respects continued to contend that the kingdom of Ireland had
 distinctive rights. This created some tensions with the British parliament,
 which from 1720 explicitly claimed the right to legislate for Ireland. However,
 the emphasis on the Irish parliament's rights seemed to be vindicated when, in
 1782-3 during the crisis brought on by the American revolution, the British
 government conceded that only the king, lords and commons of Ireland had
 the right to make laws binding on Ireland.
 Thus far, our discussion has centred mainly on the Old English dimensions
 of Irish history that Protestants were borrowing. However, historians have also
 begun to examine in more detail the extent to which Protestants borrowed
 from the Celtic past. One of Kidd's contentions is that contemporary concepts
 of "Gothic peoples" included the Celts; in principle, then, there was nothing to
 prevent the Irish Protestants of the eighteenth century also identifying with the
 Celts, or indeed with pre-Celtic peoples.35 In fact, it is clear that this did
 happen, though it has to be stressed that this was on a highly selective basis.
 For instance, one of the symbols of the kingdom of Ireland that was deployed
 increasingly after the winning of legislative independence was the "Milesian
 crown." Keating had made strong claims for the Milesians, the ancient Celtic
 people of Ireland, as a people who had a high respect for religion and learning,
 57
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 whose kings had been "sovereign" (i.e., had admitted no temporal superiors),
 and had shown a proper appreciation for parliament-like institutions.36 The
 first printed edition of Keating's history contained a frontispiece depicting
 Brian Boru, the early eleventh-century high king of Ireland and scourge of the
 Danes, wearing a crown with a distinctive spiked rim.37 Depictions of this
 crown became more frequent in the second half of the eighteenth century and
 subsequently found favour among the mainly Protestant Volunteers, set up to
 defend the country from invasion during the American revolutionary war (but
 soon taking on a political as well as a military role and championing Irish
 parliamentary rights). In 1782, the newspaper the Volunteer s Journal had as its
 masthead a Milesian crown surmounting an Irish harp, and the same crown
 frequently appeared on Volunteer flags.38 In scholarly circles, too, the device
 was taken up. When the newly formed Irish Academy (which became the
 P.oyal Irish Academy following the granting of a charter from George III in
 1786) began to publish its Transactions in the later 1780s, the cover included a
 vignette depicting Hibernia and Britannia on either side of a shield bearing a
 harp, and surmounted by a Milesian crown.39 Nor should it be supposed that it
 was only Protestants of a "reforming" outlook who were happy to identify with
 this symbol of the Celtic past. The Irish yeomanry, established by government
 as a counter-revolutionary force in 1796, was, almost from the outset, an
 overwhelmingly Protestant body.40 Its historian has argued that the flags and
 other devices of yeomanry corps invariably depicted the rounded British
 imperial crown rather than the Milesian crown.41 However, examples have now
 come to light of Irish yeomanry belt-plates and gorgets (badges) that depict the
 Milesian crown. These date from the late 1790s and even from the early 1800s
 (post-Union) period.42 Admittedly, in these cases the Milesian crown,
 surmounting an Irish harp, is shown beneath an over-arching imperial crown,
 but these examples do indicate the enduring appeal for Protestants ofthe idea
 ofthe kingdom of Ireland, and lend weight to recent claims that there was
 greater continuity between the Volunteers and the yeomanry than has generally
 been accepted.43
 Another borrowing from the Celtic past concerned St Patrick. In the early
 seventeenth century, Archbishop James Ussher of Armagh had made out a case
 for seeing the church founded by Patrick in the fifth century as a scriptural
 church that had no real contact with Rome: in other words, as a proto
 Protestant church.44 During the eighteenth century, Irish Protestants came to
 identify with this interpretation of the history of the Celtic church, and from
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 mid-century on, "Patrick" was even brought into service as an archetypal
 Irishman to represent the Anglo-Irish in their debates with government over
 Irish parliamentary rights.45
 From such willingness to identify with at least some aspects of the Old
 English and Celtic past, it seems clear that Protestants were adopting a more
 "Irish" identity. However, it should not be inferred from this that they were
 indicating any approval of Catholicism or endorsing a return to Gaelic culture,
 or indeed drawing closer to those fellow-Irishmen who represented the
 contemporary expressions of that culture. On the contrary, there is plenty of
 evidence to show that deep divisions remained between Protestants and
 Catholics (whether Irish- or English-speaking).46 Ian McBride's meticulous
 study of Presbyterian thought indicates that even radicals continued to take for
 granted the intimate connection between religion and politics: "purifying the
 body politic" thus had strong religious and anti-Catholic overtones.47 All this
 makes it difficult to find any single contemporary model into which to fit Irish
 Protestants. From some perspectives, their identity can appear to be an English
 provincial one;48 they also fit into a European ancien regime paradigm,
 illustrated (for example) by the Magyars, who differed culturally and ethnically
 from the majority Slav population, yet considered themselves to constitute the
 Hungarian nation; or the Lowland Scots, who cheerfully adopted aspects of
 Scottish Highland culture while retaining a generally contemptuous attitude
 towards the Highland Scots people.49 But there are also similarities with
 colonial patterns, in which (for example) Hispanic colonists constructed Creole
 identities from their own European ancestry and the local histories of the
 native peoples their ancestors had conquered.50
 During the 1790s, there was of course movement beyond the idea of an
 Irish kingdom in a republican, anti-monarchical direction. Circulation of the
 works of Tom Paine, and the example of revolutionary France, brought the
 language of modern republicanism into every corner of the island.51 This was
 reflected in the adoption by the United Irishmen of the symbol of the harp
 without the customary crown, whether Milesian or imperial. The Defenders, a
 mainly Catholic secret society, may also have been moving in this direction
 independently of the United Irishmen, though the extent is hard to measure.52
 However, older concepts of the term "republican" (compatible with monarchy)
 continued to be invoked, and this was true of a significant section of
 Presbyterian reformers.53 Moreover, among the many studies that have
 appeared on the troubled decade of the 1790s and especially the rebellion of
 59
This content downloaded from 
            213.202.174.151 on Tue, 19 Jan 2021 12:54:49 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Radharc
 1798, some have drawn attention to the continued preoccupation, among
 certain leading United Irishmen, with the "ancient constitution," which (if
 reformed along lines suggested by David Hume, Adam Smith and Edmund
 Burke) could overcome the shortcomings of British rule and open the way to a
 more inclusive Irish society. This was found notably among some Church of
 Ireland leaders, including Arthur O'Connor, and even Wolfe Tone.54 The
 presence of these British influences suggests that the United Irishmen, at least
 those in Dublin, may have been closer to the Grattanite Whigs than is usually
 thought: it may be worth exploring parallels with the regnalist thought of
 Arthur Griffith a century later.
 But while some in the 1790s were contemplating ways of putting
 Protestant/Catholic relations on a new and more equal footing, and
 transforming relations with Britain, the decade also witnessed a serious
 backlash against such plans. It needs to be borne in mind that although the
 extension of political rights to Catholics was not fully completed during the
 decade, the two relief acts of 1792 and 1793 went far towards ending the legal
 restrictions on Catholics exercising political rights. The right to vote, to
 become full members of guilds, corporations, and the legal profession, to bear
 arms, and to attend the only university in the country (Trinity College) were
 all conceded.55 These concessions followed a period of some twenty years
 during which most of the civil (as opposed to the political) disabilities affecting
 Catholics had been repealed, without, on the whole, provoking much in the
 way of serious opposition among Protestants. Why then was there a backlash in
 the 1790s, its most obvious manifestation the establishment ofthe Orange
 Order in 1795? Suspicion has been directed at elite sections ofthe Protestant
 gentry, who, according to some accounts, deliberately fostered a new
 sectarianism by grafting themselves on to the leadership of the Orange Order
 while (by incorporating some Orangemen into the yeomanry) the government
 turned it into an overtly sectarian force.56
 These charges are not without weight. However, they may also mislead by
 failing to make allowance for the forces producing polarisation on sectarian
 lines from the mid-1790s. Those forces affected not merely the plebeian
 Protestants who (it is generally agreed) formed the first Orange lodges in
 Ulster, but those members of the elite who lent countenance to the movement.
 The late Frank Wright suggested that the eighteenth century in Ireland
 witnessed a general decline in the solidarity ofthe settler or Protestant
 community. As members of the landed elite, bolstered by the control conferred
 60
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 by the penal laws, came to feel more secure, so they became less inclined than
 in the past to treat Protestants as a special case when (for instance) it came to
 granting leases or other favours. This helped to create paternalistic relations
 between the elite and some Catholics, but it did nothing to improve solidarity
 between non-elite Protestants and Catholics; rather, such developments
 prompted periodic bouts of Protestant emigration and (among those who
 remained) fostered resentment against both Catholics and landlords. Thus,
 Wright argues that the abandoning of the penal laws was never likely to be
 accomplished without a crisis of some sort.57 Regarding the removal of the
 penal laws as a process motivated by the self-interest of the elite, plebeian
 Protestants formed groups or associations designed to challenge the process?a
 case in point being the activities of the so-called Peep O'Day Boys (forerunners
 of the Orange Order) who raided Catholic homes to enforce the ban on
 Catholics bearing arms. Such activities obviously threatened Catholics but also
 challenged those sections of the elite that wished to relax the law. The situation
 became more unstable and liable to polarisation once the Catholics abandoned
 their deferential stance and attempted to organise themselves, as with the
 formation of the Defenders in the 1780s and 1790s, thus threatening members
 of the elite with loss of control over both Protestants and Catholics.58
 Viewed in this light, it appears that the options open to the elite were
 shrinking. What has been interpreted as gentry deliberately lending their
 countenance to the Orange Order, may in certain cases have been the result of
 something more like intimidation.59 Lord Gosford had a reputation as a
 champion of persecuted Catholics; but when he was informed on 12 July 1796
 that 1,500 Orangemen were on the spot requesting permission to march
 through his County Armagh estate, he may have felt that discretion was the
 better part of valour.60 Following the French invasion attempt in Bantry Bay in
 E>ecember 1796, the prospect of a United Irish rebellion became stronger, and
 the government's counter-revolutionary measures reinforced the polarisation
 process. Certain Presbyterian radicals began to move toward a loyalist
 position.61 When the rebellion at last took place in May-June 1798 followed by
 a French landing in August, the British government decided on a legislative
 union, and Irish M.P.s were sufficiently divided among themselves to allow the
 measure to pass into law.
 In what ways did Irish identities change after the rebellion and the Act of
 Union? It is now clear that the threat of rebellion did not immediately
 disappear following the failures of 1798 but remained formidable at least
 61
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 among the lower orders down to the period of Emmet's rebellion in 1803.62
 However, the fact that counter-revolutionary forces had triumphed meant that
 republicans had little choice but to emigrate (which many did) or to keep
 silent, and loyalism was in the ascendant for a generation or more. Studies of
 English loyalism in this period point to a number of trends that can also be
 detected in Ireland. One of these was a growing cult of monarchy.63 George III
 had got off to a rather unpopular start in Britain and Ireland in the 1760s and
 1770s, but there is evidence to suggest that during the 1790s he and the royal
 family became the focus for anti-French and anti-revolutionary solidarity. The
 king's own vulnerability had been clearly demonstrated during his illness in
 1788, when details of his horrifying treatment had been widely circulated in
 the press. In the 1790s, his frugality (and that of Queen Charlotte) smacked of
 patriotism in time of war, and appealed to the middle classes. In Ireland, his
 popularity in establishment circles was reflected in the enthusiasm with which
 his golden jubilee was celebrated in 1809, and (although the subject has not
 received detailed attention) the event caught the public imagination in a way
 that was not confined to Protestants.64
 There was also greater interest in post-union Ireland as well as in Britain in
 the overseas empire, which in the course of the revolutionary and Napoleonic
 wars had grown significantly, and had come to occupy a more important place
 in government strategic and economic thinking.65 The exploits of the armed
 forces in different parts of the world had become of considerable interest to
 Irish as well as British newspaper editors. In any case, as a result of the wars
 society had become more militarised, and (once the formal ban on Catholics
 bearing arms had been lifted in 1793) Irish soldiers, most of them Catholics,
 had entered the British forces in large numbers. Tom Bartlett has estimated
 that from 1793 to 1815, some 200,000 Irish recruits joined the British army
 and navy; this was in addition to those who served in Ireland as members of
 the (largely Catholic) militia and the (almost entirely Protestant) yeomanry.66
 As many as one in six adult males in that period may have spent time in
 uniform. Bartlett suggests that this had a marked influence on Irish society:
 many members of the various secret societies that flourished in post-union
 decades would have had some military experience. Allan Blackstock has argued
 that the militarisation of society was reflected in the Orange Order, with
 Orange processions in the early nineteenth century owing much to the military
 traditions of the yeomanry, especially the military-style flute bands and the
 playing of aggressive party tunes.67
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 Whether these broad trends tended to foster a sense of "British" identity, as
 appears to have been the case in England, Wales, and Scotland, has not been
 the subject of any systematic study.68 In the field of religion, however,
 developments were taking place that were set to reinforce divisions between
 Catholics and Protestants, and to breathe new life into Keating's equation of
 Irishness with Catholicism. Post-union Ireland was above all a place in which
 the institutional churches were extending their influence over their flocks. This
 phenomenon, which had parallels all over Europe, was nevertheless distinctive
 in Ireland. Whereas in countries such as France the post-Napoleonic period
 witnessed a significant religious revival as part of a reaction against the excesses
 of the revolutionary era, what took place in Ireland in the late eighteenth and
 early nineteenth centuries was to a considerable extent happening for the first
 time.
 Take the Catholic church. The penal laws may not have been as devasting
 in their impact as used to be thought, but they still hampered the work of the
 hierarchy in introducing the decrees of the mid-sixteenth century Council of
 Trent, which had attempted, in face of the challenge from the Protestant
 Reformation, to rid the church of its various medieval abuses. The situation in
 Ireland at the beginning of the nineteenth century was patchy. In certain areas,
 particularly in the towns and in the eastern part of the country, Tridentine
 reforms were well under way. In other areas priests were still trying to instill in
 their flocks official catechesis, regularity of Mass attendance, and-to wean them
 from various popular devotional practices that were frowned on in official
 circles.69 Signs of progress were to be seen in a spate of new church building,
 replacing the simple Mass houses of the penal era with the larger, stone-built,
 decorated chapels of the early nineteenth century. All this encouraged
 Catholics to take pride in and identify with Catholicism. At the same time,
 freed from the necessity of tailoring their case for relaxation of the penal laws
 to the sensitivities of Protestants, Catholic historians dropped their reticence
 about the role of the pope and links with Rome in the early Irish church and
 strongly reaffirmed the continuity of the Roman nature of the Catholic church
 in Ireland.70
 That the Irish Catholic church, emerging from the penal era, should wish
 to stamp its authority on its flocks and mark out its presence in the landscape
 was not surprising. What is more significant, perhaps, is that similar tendencies
 can be detected in the Church of Ireland. Archbishop William Magee is
 associated with what has been called "the second Reformation," which in the
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 1820s sought to instil greater discipline into church members and to reassert
 the claims ofthe established church to be the legitimate successor ofthe church
 founded by St Patrick.71 When he became Archbishop of Dublin in 1822,
 Magee appointed one John Semple as diocesan architect to the Board of First
 Fruits (established in 1777 to administer parliamentary grants for church
 buildings). Semple's views on church architecture were close to the
 Archbishop's.72 In contrast to the new Catholic chapels, which tended to favour
 an Italianate or classical style, Semple's churches consciously followed an early
 Irish Christian style, such as that of St Kevin's church at Glendalough, County
 Wicklow. These churches, dozens of which were built in the Dublin diocese
 during the 1820s and 1830s, were characterised by a single-chamber structure,
 steeply pitched roofs, and bell towers placed behind the west gable.73 In this
 way, an architectural dimension was added to the Church of Ireland's claim,
 boosted by the evangelical revival, to be the "national" church in Ireland.
 All this alone would have been productive of heightened religious tensions,
 and hardly conducive to removing religion from politics, as the legislative
 Union was supposed to do. But what arguably sharpened those divisions was
 the role ofthe state. In the established Church of Ireland, bishoprics were
 political appointments, and the church was subject to regulation by
 parliament. In the Catholic church, as the penal laws were gradually removed,
 and particularly as government funds were extended following the foundation
 of St Patrick's College Maynooth in 1795, it might have been expected that the
 government would obtain some sort of control, either in the form of a veto
 over episcopal appointments or through state stipends for bishops and/or
 priests (such as was exercised unofficially over the Catholic church in
 Quebec).74 A veto was indeed agreed to by the Catholic hierarchy in 1799, but
 that was on the assumption that the Act of Union would be accompanied by
 the admission of Catholics to parliament. Catholic emancipation did not come
 until 1829, and in the meantime the question of a veto became a controversial
 one for the supporters of emancipation, with liberal Protestants for the most
 part endorsing it and most Irish Catholics (their English counterparts were
 more flexible) opposing it. The Irish bishops came under some popular
 pressure to reverse their 1799 stand, and in 1808 they duly did so and stuck to
 that position despite indications from the Vatican that a veto was acceptable.75
 Thus, unusually for this period, the Catholic church entered the post
 emancipation era subject to no state control. This did nothing to reassure
 Protestants, for whom the Catholic church loomed ever more monolithic and
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 intimidating. Complaints were made that emancipation gave Catholics in
 parliament the right to legislate for the established church without there being
 any reciprocal rights.76 Only the grant to Maynooth afforded the opportunity
 for Protestant M.P.s to address the question of state funds to the Catholic
 church, and that grant duly became the subject of much wrangling both inside
 and outside parliament.77
 For Catholics, of course, the picture looked very different. They had
 obtained emancipation only after a long struggle, and even though after 1829
 they were on more or less the same legal footing as Protestants, the legacy from
 the eighteenth century meant that Protestants were still entrenched in many
 areas of Irish public life: the civil service, grand juries, and urban corporations.
 The only way that this was likely to change was by opening career to talent and
 linking the franchise in urban corporations to property rather than birth or
 confessional allegiance.
 Irish Catholics thus became exceptional in early nineteenth-century Europe
 for the fact that they identified not with conservative or reactionary political
 parties but with liberalism.78 Some Protestants were generous enough to
 support liberal reforms, but since the effects would be (for instance) to turn
 Protestant corporations into Catholic ones, there was a great deal at stake, and
 most Protestants sided with the forces of conservatism. The broad sectarian
 divide in politics was reinforced by the decision of Daniel O'Connell
 immediately after emancipation to adopt as the slogan for his essentially liberal
 party "the repeal of the Union." He may have had little choice. The
 emancipation campaign had revealed the continued existence of republican
 ideas among some of his supporters, and O'Connell was keen to harness as
 wide a spectrum of Irish opinion as possible behind his liberal agenda. His
 occasional residence in Dublin, where the loss of the Irish parliament was still
 keenly felt by Protestants, may have led him to suppose that Irish Protestants in
 general would support a repeal movement. But in fact even liberal Protestants,
 who had supported the emancipation campaign, were reluctant to endorse a
 goal that seemed likely to afford even greater opportunities for Catholicism to
 entrench itself in every part of Irish life.79 The Union, though it took time to
 become popular with Protestants, seemed to guarantee them and the
 established church some sort of security.
 If O'Connellite repeal was liberalism in another guise, this was not the case
 for the "Young Irelanders" in O'Connell's movement, who (unlike him) saw
 the repeal of the Union as a goal that would stem the tide of anglicisation and
 65
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 preserve the Irish language. Although certain Young Irelanders moved in a
 republican direction during the year of European revolution in 1848, most of
 them were content to seek a restored and reformed Irish parliament under the
 crown to comprehend Catholics and Protestants, natives and newcomers.
 In conclusion, it is clear that most ofthe main post-Union trends?
 anglicisation, militarisation, the advance of the institutional churches?were
 already under way before 1800. And because Protestantism had been such a
 defining characteristic of the elite in eighteenth-century Ireland, it was always
 likely that nineteenth-century politics?with or without the Union?would
 have had a strong sectarian flavour as Catholics sought to give practical effect
 to the legal rights they had gained and Protestants defended the status quo.
 However, in one respect?the abolition of the Irish parliament?the Act of
 Union was crucial. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Irish
 parliamentary tradition already exerted a powerful influence on the
 imagination of Irish constitutional nationalists80 and this ensured that the Act
 of Union itself would remain a key political issue in nineteenth-century
 Ireland.
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 Notes
 1 I should like to thank Glucksman Ireland House for the invitation to
 give this talk, and especially Professor Joe Lee and Caitlin Quinn for their
 hospitality. The latter s editorial assistance was much appreciated. I am grateful
 to the Cultural Relations Committee of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
 Dublin, for a grant in aid of travel costs.
 2 R. B. McDowell, "The Age of the United Irishmen" in A New History
 of Ireland TV: Eighteenth-Century Ireland, eds. T W. Moody and W. E. Vaughan
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 363-4.
 3 Ron Weir, "The Scottish and Irish Unions" and Paul O'Leary
 "Accommodation and Resistance: A Comparison of Cultural Identities in
 Ireland and Wales, c. 1880-1914" in Kingdoms United? Great Britain and
 Ireland Since 1500, ed. S.J. Connolly (Dublin and Portland, OR: Four Courts
 Press, 1999), 56-66, 123-34.
 4 P. S. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland Under the Union (London:
 Methuen, 1952) 3.
 5 See Louis Cullen, "Catholics Under the Penal Laws," Eighteenth
 Century Ireland 1: 23-36.
 6 Patrick Fagan, An Irish Bishop in Penal Times: The Chequered Career of
 Sylvester Lloyd OEM, 1680-1747 (Dublin and Portland, OR: Four Courts
 Press, 1993), 34-5, 187-8; and Catholics in a Protestant Country (Dublin and
 Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1998), ch. 2.
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 7 Maureen Wall, "Catholic Ireland in the Eighteenth Century," in
 Collected Essays of Maureen Wall, ed. Gerard O'Brien (Dublin: Geography
 Publications, 1989), ch. 3; Kevin Whelan, "An Underground Gentry? Catholic
 Middlemen in Eighteenth-Century Ireland," Eighteenth-Century Ireland 10
 (1995): 7-68.
 8 Fagan, Catholics in a Protestant Country, chapters 3-4.
 9 Eamon O'Flaherty, "Urban Politics and Municipal Reform in
 Limerick," Eighteenth-Century Ireland 6 (1991), 105-20.
 10 Thomas P. Power, "Converts," in Endurance and Emergence, ed. T. P.
 Power and Kevin Whelan (Blackrock: Irish Academic Press, 1990), 101-27.
 11 C. D. A. Leighton, Catholicism in a Protestant Kingdom: A Study ofthe
 Irish Ancien Regime (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1994), ch. 1.
 12 Niall 6 Ciosain, Print and Popular Culture in Ireland, 1750-1850
 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997), 174-5.
 13 See Katharine Simms, "Charles Lynegar, the 0 Luinin Family and the
 Study of Seanchas," in A Miracle of Learning': Studies in Manuscripts and Irish
 Learning, eds. T. Barnard, D. Q Cronin, and K. Simms (Aldershot: Ashgate,
 1998), 266-83.
 14 Ibid, 375-76.
 15 Susannah Proctor Flory, Fragments of Family History (London: Hodder
 Brothers: 1896; limited run. Copy in Representative Church Body Library,
 Dublin), 41-2.
 16 0 Ciosain, Print and Popular Culture in Ireland, 53-6.
 17 V. G. Kiernan, The Duel in European History (Oxford: Oxford
 University Press, 1989), ch. 9; and James Kelly, That Damnd Thing Called
 Honour: Duelling in Ireland, 1570-1860 (Cork: Cork University Press, 1995),
 12-13.
 18 Kelly, That Damnd Thing Called Honour, 13-14, 127,203-5.
 19 Ibid, 46-7, 242-47.
 20 Patrick Fagan, ed., Ireland in the Stuart Papers (Dublin and Portland,
 OR: Four Courts Press, 1995); Breandan 0 Buachalla, Aisling Ghear na
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 Stiobhartaigh agus an tAos Leinn, 1603-1788 (Baile Atha Cliath: An Clochomhar,
 1996); Vincent Morley, "Ta an Cruatan ar Sheoirse?Folklore or Politics?"
 Eighteenth-Century Ireland 13 (1998): 112-20; Eamonn O'Ciardha, "The
 Stuarts and Deliverance in Irish and Scots-Gaelic Poetry, 1690-1760," in
 Kingdoms United? Great Britain and Ireland Since 1500, ed. SJ. Connolly, 78
 94.
 21 Leigh ton, Catholicism in a Protestant Kingdom, ch. 5.
 22 (_) Ciosain, Print and Popular Culture in Ireland, 102-06; Hugh Reily,
 Ireland's Case Briefly Stated, 1695.
 23 Micheal Mac Craith, review of Aisling Ghear, by Breandan O
 Buachalla, Eighteenth-Century Ireland 13 (1998): 170.
 24 Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites (Manchester and New York: Manchester
 University Press, 1994), ch. 1.
 25 See James Kelly, "The Origins of the Act of Union," Irish Historical
 Studies 25 (1987): 236-63; Jim Smyth, "'Like Amphibious Animals': Irish
 Protestants, Ancient Britons, 1691-1707," Historical Journal 3>G (1993): 785
 97; and Jacqueline Hill, "Popery and Protestantism, Civil and Religious
 Liberty: The Disputed Lessons of Irish History, 1690-1812," Past & Present
 118 (1988): 96-129.
 26 J. T. Leerssen, "Anglo-Irish Patriotism and Its European Context,"
 Eighteenth-Century Ireland 3 (1988): 7-24.
 27 Colin Kidd, British Identities Before Nationalism: Ethnicity and
 Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press, 1999).
 28 Ibid., 9-11.
 29 Ibid., 79-81,250-55.
 30 William Molyneux, The Case of Ireland, Stated (Dublin: Joseph Ray,
 1698).
 31 Charles I. McGrath, The Making of the Eighteenth-Century Irish
 Constitution (Dublin and Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2000), 73.
 32 Geoffrey Keating, Foras Feasa ar Eireann; first published as The
 General History of Ireland, trans. Dermod O'Connor (Dublin, 1723).
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 33 Bernadette Cunningham, The World of Geoffrey Keating (Dublin and
 Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2000).
 34 Ibid, ch. 11.
 35 Kidd, British Identities Before Nationalism, 81-82; see also pp. 170-71
 for a discussion of the interest shown in the Fir Bolg and other pre-Gaelic
 peoples (thought by some English and Protestant scholars to be descended
 from British tribes).
 36 Keating, The General History of Ireland. Vol. 1. (Dublin: James Duffy,
 1841), 176-77.
 37 Cunningham, The World of Geoffrey Keating, 219.
 38 Allan Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army: The Irish Yeomanry, 1796
 1834(Dublin and Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1998), 111.
 39 Transactions of ^the Royal Irish Academy (Dublin: R.I.A., 1787).
 40 Some Catholics joined the yeomanry in its early days, but some were
 already beginning to be excluded as polarisation on sectarian lines intensified
 in the lead up to the rebellion. See Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army, 60-72,
 122.
 41 Ibid., 111.
 42 Beltplate ofthe Slieveardagh and Comsey Union Cavalry (1797?);
 beltplate ofthe Merchants' Yeomanry Corps, Dublin city (1802), National
 Army Museum, London.
 43 Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army, 173; W.A. Maguire, ed., Up in
 Arms: The 1798 Rebellion in Ireland, A Bicentenary Exhibition (Belfast: Ulster
 Museum, 1998), 142.
 44 James Ussher, Discourse ofthe Religion Anciently Professed by the Irish
 and Scottish (Dublin, 1622).
 45 Bridget McCormack, Perceptions of St. Patrick in Eighteenth-Century
 Ireland (Dublin and Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2000), ch. 3.
 46 Joseph Liechty, "Testing the Depth of Catholic/Protestant Conflict,"
 Archivium Hibernicum 42 (1987): 13-28; Leigh ton, Catholicism in a Protestant
 Kingdom, ch. 3; Kidd, British Identities Before Nationalism, 181.
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 471. R. McBride, Scripture Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),
 166-73.
 48 T. C. Barnard, "Athlone 1685; Limerick 1710: Religious Riots or
 Charivaris?" Studia Hibernica 27 (1993): 61-75.
 49 S. J. Connolly, Religion, Law and Power (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
 1992), 2-3; Leigh ton, Catholicism in a Protestant Kingdom, ch. 2; Kidd, British
 Identities Before Nationalism, 178-79; William Doyle, "The Union in a
 European Context," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 10 (2000): 167
 80.
 50 Nicholas Canny, "Identity Formation in Ireland: The Emergence of
 the Ango-Irish," in Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. N.
 Canny and A. Pagden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 195-96;
 Kidd, British Identities Before Nationalism, 179-81.
 51 David Dickson, "Paine and Ireland," in The United Irishmen, ed. D.
 Dickson, D. Keogh, and K. Whelan (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1993), 135-50;
 and Kevin Whelan, "The United Irishmen, the Enlightenment and Popular
 Culture," in The United Irishmen, 269-96.
 52 Jim Smyth, "Popular Politicisation, Defenderism and the Catholic
 Question," in Ireland and the French Revolution, ed. H. Gough and D. Dickson
 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1990), 109-116.
 53 Nancy Curtin, The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and
 Dublin, 1791-1798 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), ch. 1; McBride,
 Scripture Politics, 176-78.
 54 Arthur O'Connor, The State of Ireland, ed. James Livesey (Dublin:
 Lilliput Press, 1998), 107-09; Hiroko Goto, "The Dawn of Anti-Imperialism:
 Irish Radicals and Their Liberal Project for Modernisation of Ireland in the
 1780s-90s" (Ph.D. Thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 1998), chs. 6, 8.
 55 Thomas Bartlett, The Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation (Dublin: Gill
 and Macmillan, 1992), chs. 8-9.
 56 Kevin Whelan, "The Origins of the Orange Order," BuUdn 2 (1996):
 19-20, 34.
 57 Frank Wright, Two Lands on One Soil: Ulster Politics Before Home Rule
 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1996), 24.
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 58 Ibid, ch. 2.
 59 Whelan, "The Origins ofthe Orange Order," 19-20.
 60 Allan Blackstock, "'The Invincible Mass': Loyal Crowds in Mid
 Ulster, 1795-96," in Crowds in Ireland c. 1720-1920, ed. P. Jupp and E.
 Magennis (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), 103-06.
 61 McBride, Scripture Politics, 185.
 62 Liam Chambers, Rebellion in Kildare, 1790-1803 (Dublin and
 Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1998) ch. 7; Ruan O'Donnell, Aftermath:
 Post-Rebellion Insurgency in Wicklow, 1799-1803 (Dublin and Portland, OR:
 Irish Academic Press, 2000).
 63 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven
 and London: Yale University Press, 1992), ch. 5; Marilyn Morris, The British
 Monarchy and the French Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale University
 Press, 1998).
 64 Jacqueline Hill, From Patriots to Unionists: Dublin Civic Politics and
 Irish Protestant Patriotism, 1660-1840 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 275
 78
 65 Michael Duffy, "World Wide War and British Expansion, 1793
 1815" in The Oxford History ofthe British Empire II: The Eighteenth Century,
 ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 184-207.
 66 Bartlett, The Fall and Rise ofthe Irish Nation, 322-23.
 67 Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army, 300.
 68 Colley, Britons, ch. 7; see also Hill, From Patriots to Unionists, 275-80.
 69 P. J. Corish, The Catholic Community in the Seventeenth and
 Eighteenth Centuries (Dublin: Helicon, 1981), ch. 5.
 70 Jacqueline Hill, "Popery and Protestantism, Civil and Religious
 Liberty: The Disputed Lessons of Irish History, 1690-1812," Past & Present
 118(1988): 127-8.
 71 Desmond Bowen, The Protestant Crusade in Ireland, 1800-70 (Dublin
 and Montreal: Gill and Macmillan and McGill-Queen's University Press,
 1978), ch. 5.
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 72 Cormac Allen, "The Church Architecture of John Semple and Son"
 (M. Arch. Sc. Thesis, National University of Ireland?University College
 Dublin, 1995) 1:6-13.
 73 Ibid., 1:65,83-84.
 74 Hugh Somers, "The Legal Status of the Bishop of Quebec," Catholic
 Historical Review 19 (1933-34): 167-89.
 75 C. D. A. Leighton, "Gallicanism and the Veto Controversy," in
 Religion, Conflict and Coexistence, ed. R .V Comerford et al. (Dublin: Gill and
 Macmillan, 1990), 135-58; Bartlett, The Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation, chs.
 12-13.
 76 Thomas Lefroy, Report of the Speech Delivered . . . at the Second
 General Meeting of the Brunswick Constitutional Club of Ireland (Dublin: 1829).
 77 E. R. Norman, Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England (London: Allen
 andUrwin, 1968), 23-51.
 78 Leighton, Catholicism in a Protestant Kingdom, 159-60.
 79 Hill, From Patriots to Unionists, 345-54, 376-88.
 80 K. B. Nowlan, "The Meaning of Repeal in Irish History," in
 Historical Studies IV, ed. G. A. Hayes-McCoy (London: Bowes and Bowes,
 1963), 1-17.
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